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Abstract.The paper examines, using Deconstruction as an analytical framework, the desire 
by Niyi Osundare and Abubakar Othman to resolve the problematics in and around the 
composition and reading of poetry in particular and literature in general. The analysis of 
Osundare’s “Poetry Is” and Othman’s “Wordsworth Lied” demonstrates the ways in which 
language is not a transparent medium for the representation of truth, knowledge, beliefs 
since the reading of poetry must scrupulously and tenaciously tease out the point at which 
the texts differ from themselves. Indeed, language may be a medium through which humans 
express thoughts, feelings, ideas or forge an identity, but it cannot be reduced to a 
subjective apprehension. Arguably, the play of difference within language is what makes 
identity possible and at the same time, thwarts it infinitely. Therefore, the paper concludes 
with the argument that the two speakers in the selected poems are caught up in self-
contradiction or auto-deconstruction, in that there are tensions between what they meant 
and what the texts say. 
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1 Introduction 
There is always already deconstruction, at work in works, especially in literary works. Derrida 
(1986). In the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a self-differentiating identity, 
an identity different from itself, having an opening or gap within itself. Derrida (1997). Niyi 
Osundare is one of the leading figures among Nigerian second generation poets that emerge 
immediately after the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 and 1970. The emergence of Osundare on the 
Nigerian literary scene marks a paradigm shift in the composition of poetry. For Osundare, 
poetry should serve as a transparent medium of human expression, feelings, thoughts through 
which individuals come to grasp the social, political, economic, and historical reality within 
their immediate society. To do this job satisfactorily, poets must employ poetic aesthetics that 
are not rooted “in Grecoroman lore”, but are indigenous to all readers irrespective of their social 
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status. Arguably, Osundare’s iconoclastic tendency could be seen as a revolutionary stance 
against Nigerian first generation poets such as Christopher Okigbo, Wole Soyinka, John Pepper 
Clark-Bekederemo whose poetry collections are overwhelmed with “esoteric” dialect 
“entombed in Grecoroman lore” (Anyokwu, 2015; Ekpenyong, 2014; Garuba, 2003).  
Indeed, one of the poems in Songs of the Marketplace entitled “Poetry Is” serves as a viable 
poetic voice of what poetry should be for both African poets and readers. This poem, so to 
speak, calls into question the retour aux fixation of “Greco-Roman lore” or modernist 
aestheticization that informed the first generation writers. It is in this regard that Egya (2014) 
argues that Osundare, like Odia Ofeimun’s “The Poet Lied”, dismantles the long-established 
Euro-American poetic aesthetics in order to formulate a new poetic art that could serve “the 
plight of the peasant and the poor” (p. 16). Or, as Funso Aiyejina discursively argues: 
‘Ofeimun’s concern with the oppressed, his anger at and impatience with opportunistic artists, 
public morality, cultural inadequacies, economic mismanagement […] are qualities which he 
shares with Niyi Osundare” (cited in Egya, p. 17). This argument also finds expression in 
Osundare’s most celebrated essay, “The Writer as Righter”, where he derides Soyinka, Okigbo, 
Clark, and Echeruo because their political and poetic engagement is hinged on “a cacophony of 
mythmaking and impenetrable idiom” (cited in Egya, p. 32). However, the aspiration of this 
paper is to explore how this manifesto-poem or meta-poem is implicated in the deconstruction 
of what it sets out to banish; that is, how tropes undermine the central argument in the poem. 
Another revolutionary figure in Nigerian literature is Abubakar Othman. Whereas Niyi 
Osundare is occupied with the question of poetic composition, Othman makes waves for a new 
trend in the criticism of African literature. The argument in the poem titled “Wordsworth Lied” 
is a case in point. Central to Othman’s “Wordsworth Lied” is the proposition that criticism 
should go beyond the circle of the Romantic tradition of poetic composition and criticism. That 
is, readers should look beyond authorial sensibility towards a close reading which is not likely 
to illuminate the authorial feelings and response, to historical space that shapes his personality; 
the task of reader, so to speak, is to concentrate on the literary artefacts (literariness) of text. 
What reader comes to understand about the text is not metaphysically given but rather is 
progressively discovered through a critical scrutiny of what is at stake in the words on the page; 
in essence, the reader is concern with content and not form. In similar manner, Othman depicts 
the problematic inherent in writers’ “attempts to reconcile their artistry to the sense of social 
commitment that confronts them in the literary tradition in which they find themselves” (Egya, 
pp. 50-51). Therefore, the central problematic of this paper is to demonstrate how the poem fails 
to vindicate its arguments within the premise of binary oppositions between authorial reading 
and intrinsic reading, between form and content. 
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The analytical framework for this paper is deconstruction with emphasis on Derrida’s 
philosophical thought on reading and interpretation. Deconstruction’s defense of textualism 
does not look forward to a discourse or language that can pin down the truth, reality of things. 
Deconstructionists, such as Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, Roland Barthes, and other 
deconstructionists, argue that language is figurative in nature; language operates on the basis of 
differentiation. Difference is what makes identity possible and at the same time thwarts it 
infinitely. Hence, language only offers, so to speak, opinion (“doxa”) and not reality, truth or 
transcendental signified. Thus, inherent in human languages (spoken or written) is the plurality 
of an irreducible, indeterminant meaning. On this view, interpretation should itself be a kind of 
textual, rhetorical performance, much like the text it studies. That is, interpretation of text 
should be an unending dialogue between the text and the readers. To put it in the words of De 
Man (1971):  
This dialogue between work and interpreter is 
endless…Understanding can be called complete only when it 
becomes aware of its own temporal predicament and realize that 
horizon within which the totalization can take place is time itself. 
The act of understanding is temporal act that has its own history, 
but this history forever eludes totalization (p. 32).  
In this sense, both the writer and the reader should only wear the “mask of rhetoric” to offer a 
discourse that would not allow a desire for closure, or for anything which might exist beyond 
and outside of the text. This means that neither the author nor the reader, nor context is desirable 
but the text itself as a differential network of traces, so that both the text and interpretation can 
go on in their different ways as a moving or an unending chain of signifiers, an open-ended play 
of signification. 
 Derrida (1988) maintains that “no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context 
permits saturation” (p. 136). For Derrida, the word “context” is another name for what he calls 
“a chain of possible substitutions” without a close or an end. Context can also be described as 
anything that cannot be apprehended directly, but only through a system of differences, a 
differential trace, and the interpretive experience. Deconstruction, therefore, posits that 
discourse should not be attributed or attached to origins to which interpretation could return to 
unfold meaning. In fact, Derrida (1982) has discursively argued that context is neither a name 
nor a concept but a moving chain of “non-synonymous substitutions” (pp. 7-12; see also Royle 
2003, pp. 71-83). On this note, it is uncritical and misleading for Niyi Osundare and Abubakar 
Othman to pose the question of poetry and criticism in terms of what “is” without taking into 
consideration the differential network of traces. Therefore, the central problematic of this paper 
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is to explore how the play of figurative language undermines every attempt to totalize and to 
homogenize the identity of poetry. It is a reading which tries to find out how the selected texts 
are caught up in self (auto)-deconstruction.  
2      The Problem of Definition 
The title of the poem “Poetry is” and its repetition at the beginning of each stanza conveys the 
poetic speaker’s attempt to define what “poetry is” and what “poetry is” not. The speaker 
presents the major features that could be used as a yardstick for judging the overall standard of 
poetry as a genre of writing. In the first stanza, the speaker contends with and pillories the 
esotericism with which poetry has always been attributed to by Eurocentric poets. Such esoteric 
language, for the speaker, is not indigenous to the imaginative world of the reader; thereby 
“excluding” them from the intentionalism of the poem. He further maintains that poetry is a 
mere medium or device used to gain the attention and recognition of an alien audience. By 
implication, poetry is not an embodiment of allusion to Greek-Roman mythological 
representation of experience in the society. The exploration of the richness of the classical texts, 
for the speaker, is not a vital corrective tool for the prevalent issues that bewailed contemporary 
society. Poetry, which alludes to “Grecoroman lore”, tends to deliberately create an “esoteric 
whisper”, “excluding tongue”, “a clap trap”, “quiz”; all signifying a sense of ambiguity and 
exclusion. Poetry of such is personal and only gives an idea of meaning (doxa). Therefore, 
poetic composition that revolves around issues of “Grecoroman lore” is of then and there, rather 
than here and now. The speaker sees how deep Greek-Roman mythological representations and 
understanding of life and world had penetrated into the contemporary consciousness: 
Poetry is 
not the esoteric whisper 
of an excluding tongue 
not a clap trap 
for a wondering audience 
not a learned quiz 
entombed in Grecoroman lore 
Thus, the speaker accentuates, in stanza two, what he perceived to be an authentic poetry. 
Poetry is depicted as an essential figure of being and existence for the subaltern or local people, 
which serves as an inward exploration of human experience. The word “timbre”, in this stanza, 
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suggests the downtrodden in the society who have been isolated from the worldview of the so-
called educated elite and, at the same time, pushed to the backwater side of the society. In 
essence, poetry forcefully moves the subaltern to action and forewarns the autocratic elite of the 
consequence of their action. On this basis, poetry serves as a medium of self-evaluation for the 
‘violent hierarchy between the elite and the peasants. For the speaker, poetry which attempts to 
explore human experience and predicament would interrogate with different groups of people 
both learned and unlearned, and with different social forces that shaped and undermined human 
life and experience. That is, any poem that explores social issues irrespective of gender, status, 
ethnicity, cultural origin receives lofty attention from the reader. The speaker employs imagery 
that is indigenous to local people whom he identifies with; such as “timbre” and “pluck.” 
The speaker further defines poetry as a representation of the masses’ outcry. The masses are 
metaphorically referred to as “hawker”. The expression “hawker’s ditty” suggests the 
continuous complaints of the masses which have been fallen on the deaf ears of the elite. This 
gives an insight into the malicious attitude and insensitivity of the elite in their daily interaction 
with the masses. Poetry should draw the attention of the public (“the eloquence of the gong” and 
“the luminous ray”) to the plight and disillusionment of the local people (“the lyric of the 
marketplace” and “the grass’s morning dew”). The entire stanza three is structured around audio 
and visual imagery which are typical to the local setting: “hawker”, “gong”, “marketplace”, 
“grass’s morning dew”. 
The fourth stanza offers a revolutionary change of thought in the definition of poetry such that 
there is a paradigm shift in the poetic speaker’s definitions of poetry. This qualitative leap of 
thought could be comprehended in the shift of definitions from social exploration to personal 
experience of the mind. On this basis, the speaker defines poetry as the outpouring of emotional 
feelings in tranquility. The tranquility of the mind is metaphorically described as “the soft wind” 
which appease to overflowing and sheer pleasure of emotional feeling, “musics to the dancing 
leaf”. The personification, “dancing leaf”, smacks of the unstable state of the speaker’s mind. 
Thus, poetry has the power of reinforcement and intensification of feeling and excitement 
through the musical pattern and composition of rhythmical cadence. By implication, poetry is 




what the sole tells the dusty path 
what the bee hums to the alluring nectar 
what rainfall croons the lowering eaves 
Hence, in the speaker’s view, poetry is not a philosophical discourse (“oracle’s kernel”) where 
“philosopher” took to philosophizing with a “stone”; that is, it is not a meta-discourse 
embellished with figurative language such as “esoteric whisper”, “excluding tongue”, “clap 
trap”, “learned quiz”, and “Greecoroman lore” and among other literary tropes. Thus, the 
speaker points out that philosophical or theoretical argument has no social and political 
implications; this implies that philosophy and theory have no useful essence and should be 
discarded. The speaker concludes on the note that the entire identity of poetry depends on the 
subjective apprehension of the reader. This means that it is the theoretical impulse of the 
individual reader that brings about the textual meaning of poetry. Therefore, the entire meaning 
of poetry is the outcome of an interaction between poetry and reader: 
Poetry is 
Man 
Meaning to  
Man  
However, the question of the reductive simplifications in the meaning or the definition of poetry 
has been challenged by Deconstruction. The terseness of the poem’s title suggests that poetry 
has a predetermined meaning. The repetition of the phrase, “Poetry is” – at the beginning of 
each stanza – brings to mind the attempt by the poetic speaker to pin down what poetry should 
be. The phrase is itself a deceptive one because it already connotes that poetry has been 
furnished with a final signified. That is, poetry as a unified practice of writing. A close reading 
of the poem clearly shows that the speaker is not strictly accentuating about what “Poetry is”, or 
even what a particular poem could be but perhaps a description of a particular tradition of 
writing. It is a description because it seeks only to characterize, demonstrate, and represent what 
“Poetry is”. It also attempts to explain what a kind or variety of “Poetry is”.  
Nietzsche has argued that all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated 
goes beyond the circle of definition or reappropriation; only that which has no history is 
definable. In essence, Nietzsche is of the opinion that poetry is a composition of language, 
figuration that cannot be frozen within a particular intellectual and ideological context. For 
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Nietzsche, poetry is not a stable tradition of writing, a finished product, a meta-language with a 
furnished meaning. On this premise, poetry is a composition of sign that is devoid of a definite 
meaning and always in a perpetual quest for its own meaning. The speaker attempts to define 
what “Poetry is” is a denial of writing as the play within language: the need to “search for the 
other of language” (Derrida 1986, p. 15), to bring to the fore or uncover what is “unreadable” in 
the text (De Man 2000), to locate the point in which the text (poem) “turned against itself in the 
temporal folds of error and irony” (Davis and Schleifer 1991, p. 167), to read where the texts 
“get into trouble, come unstuck, offer to contradict themselves” (Eagleton 1996: p. 134). The 
insistence on transparent reference in poetry is precisely an attempt to misread and set aside the 
way figurative language functions and performs in the entire structure and production of literary 
work. 
Arguably, the speaker’s depiction of the task of philosopher and the entire process of 
philosophizing with metaphorically tool (“stone”) is an attempt to demonstrate the ultimate task 
of intelligentsias, such as the speaker itself, who are visionary for their society. It is the task of 
writers to philosophize with “stone” in order to liberate man from captivity. The “kernel” 
symbolizes the power that sleeps within man in the same way an image (a nut) sleeps within 
unhewn kernel. The speaker, like a philosopher, sees it as his task to educate (“gather timber”, 
“pluck”, “harbinger of action”, “stir”) man how to free himself from the “kernel” in which he is 
imprisoned by the superior being. The speaker, philosophizing with metaphorical objects like 
“stone” and “hammer”, is synonymous to Nietzsche’s task in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (2006). 
Nietzsche describes what he calls “philosophizing with a hammer” as a task to liberate man 
from the orthodox and theological notions of being and essence. This presumably means man is 
at the center of creation and does not need to seek for meaning of his being and existence from 
an alien Being, omniscience being (god or God): to simplify, 
But I am always driven anew to human beings by my ardent will 
to create; thus the hammer is driven toward the stone. Oh you 
human beings, in the stone sleeps an image, the image of my 
images! A shame it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! Now 
my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. Shards shower from 
the stone: what do I care? (TSZ, II: “Upon the Blessed Isles”, p. 
66).   
However, Nietzsche notes that it requires fervent effort and determination on the side the 
“oracle” or, in the words of the speaker, “a sole philosopher” to liberate humanity from 
conventional beliefs and norms which have enslaved the critical thinking of man. Interestingly, 
while Nietzsche philosophizes with “hammer”, the speaker, on the other hand, philosophizes 
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with the metaphor of “gather”, “pluck” “stir” to envision how poetry could be used to encourage 
people to stir up a revolutionary spirit in all their struggles to liberate the human thought from 
an epistemic understanding of human essence and existence. In addition, Soyinka (2018), the 
son of Ogun, sees himself as one, charged with the responsibility to liberate the oppressed from 
the shackles of minority “self-recycling geriatrics”, to set up a direction for a new generation:  
[Ogun] has handed me his machete and given marching orders, 
saying, Son of Ogun, take this machete and cut through the 
brambles of lies, hypocrisy, double-talk and pontification and 
insincere sententious. Cut off the tongue of liar so that your 
people can know some peace (pp. 45-46).  
For the speaker, poetry is conceived as a rhythmical composition which becomes meaningful 
only when “Grecoroman lore” collapsed. The understanding of human plights and struggles 
from a foreign or Greek-Roman perspective is inadequate because, as he argues, such allusion 
tends to “exclude” certain group of people, and serves as “a clap trap/for a wondering 
audience”. Therefore, the speaker philosophizes with ordinary language as a medium to give 
voice to “the hawker’s ditty”. It may be pertinent and productive to maintain that literary texts, 
like poems, are writings that require rhetorical readings and contextual analysis. Culler (2000) 
rightly contends that “[o]ne striking signal of this is that philosophical texts have become 
literary in the classic sense that, like poems, they are not supposed to be paraphrased: to 
paraphrase is to miss what is essential” (p. 286). To typecast poetry is to slot it into a certain 
tradition of writing rather than to perceive it as a performative act. Despite the speaker’s claims 
to the contrary, the argument in the poem is still imbricated with the task of philosophizing with 
poetry. In fact, the speaker, Nietzsche (a Greco-roman philosopher), and Soyinka (“nationalist-
modernist”) are all men of the same skill. 
The speaker of “Poetry Is” sets out to dismantle literary works which are written in condensed 
language (tropes) at the expense of ordinary language so as to demonstrate the total effect, 
potency and superiority of local imagery over the “Grecoroman lore”. Thus, rather than the 
speaker to neutralize the hierarchical oppositions of figurative and literal poetic aesthetics—by 
undermining the notion that there can be the transcendental foundations for meaning—the 
speaker eventually demonstrates the superior virtues of ordinary language as the “center” which 
gives meaning and identity to poetry. This unwarranted presumption of language by the speaker 
needs to be confronted. The separation of figurative language (tropes) from ordinary or 
pedestrian language in the literary-critical composition and pedagogy is groundless, facile, and 
superfluous. This fact is so baffling that it leads Derrida (1976, p. 158) to argue that writers 
write within a system and logic over which they have no absolute control. White (1978: p. 98), 
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Fowler (1981) and Laird (1999) also vindicate this argument respectively. For them, there is no 
fictive domain in language and writing; or separation of “esoteric whisper”, “Greecoroman lore” 
and “the eloquence of the gong”, “the lyric of the marketplace” because both signifying images 
are linguistically homogeneous in style and trope. Thus, both figurative and ordinary languages 
are inseparable (whatever “meanings” are attributed to them) because they are both rhetorical 
and not representational. Also, De Man (1971) avers: “All language is, to some extent, involved 
in interpretation, though all language certainly does not achieve understanding” (31). Or as 
Nietzsche (1968) succinctly puts it that there is no such thing as “natural” or “ordinary” 
language as opposed to figurative of rhetorical language; that is, language is purely rhetorical or 
“clap trap” and does not reflect reality beyond and outside itself (p. 516). 
The Greco-Roman culture and language, with which this practice is implicated, insists, despite 
the speaker’s argument, on using customary interpretive procedures. Arguably, the speaker first 
deciphers what poetry is or could be in the traditional way of the Greeco-Roman poetic 
composition and discourse. To decipher poetry through the reading of Grecoroman lore is not, 
theoretically speaking, a way of rehearsing and preserving the cultural heritage inscribed in the 
lore. It is an analysis which attempts to investigate how the thoughts and ideas “entombed in 
Grecoroman lore” work and do not work, to demonstrate the play of contradictions, ambiguities, 
paradoxes, heterogeneity within the Grecoroman lore. So, the task of a deconstructive critic is to 
find out the deconstructive process at work in the differential play of meaning. While the 
speaker conceives poetry as originary to Greek heritage, Derrida (1997) strongly maintains that:  
This heritage is the heritage of a model, not simply a model, but 
of a model that self-deconstructs, that deconstructs itself, so as to 
uproot, to become independent of its own grounds, so to speak, 
so that, today, philosophy is Greek and it is not Greek… So, we 
have to go back constantly to the Greek origin, not in order to 
cultivate the origin, or in order to protect the etymology, the 
etymon, the philological purity of the origin, but in order first of 
all to understand where we come from. Then we have to analyze 
the history and the historicity of the breaks which have produced 
our current world out of Greece, for instance, out of Christianity, 
out of this origin, and breaking or transforming this origin, at the 
same time. So there is this tension. (p. 10)  
The attempt to establish the question of canon, between “Greecoroman lore” and indigenous 
artistry (the hawker’s ditty/ the eloquence of the gong/ the lyric of the marketplace/ the 
luminous ray/ on the grass’s morning dew) in poetic reading and writing, is regarded by Derrida 
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(1997, p. 11) as uncritical and superfluous within literary and philosophical practices. To put it 
slightly and technically, Derrida (1976) further puts pressure on the question of canon 
formation: “[Without] all the instruments of traditional criticism . . . critical production would 
risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything. But this 
indispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading” (p. 158). 
The implicit assumption that poetry is an autonomous activity of the critical efforts of “man”, 
presumably the author or the reader, needs to be taken up and refined. For the speaker, the 
implicit foreknowledge of a poetic text exists ontologically prior to the text itself. Since, for the 
speaker, meaning comes into existence as a result of “man’s” experience, it is unclear whether 
to seek the meaning of the text through the authorial psychological disposition or through the 
intentional structure of literary form or through the subjective apprehension of the reader. 
Reading, to be sure, is an irreducible process of scattered practices that goes beyond the circle of 
subjectivism or meta-reading. To read and evaluate a literary text is not to seek for a 
predetermined interpretive model of reading because reading itself is an infinite crafty play of 
meaning. In the same vein, Macherey (2006) argues that literary objects “have no prior 
existence but are thought into being” through critical practices (p. 5). This simply means that the 
object of interpretation is not given in advance of interpretation but is gradually discovered 
through a differential play of traces. In other words, interpretation is not to give the meaning of 
the object but the addition, the differential, the supplementarity within the object of study. The 
reading of literary work (for instance, poem) demands close attention to the working of its 
language. Therefore, a close reading of language enables the reader or critic to explore 
tenaciously the identity of the text through a rigorous scrutiny of paradoxes, tensions, 
discrepancies between what is said (content) and how (form) it is said in the poem. 
3      Poetry and Relativism 
Abubakar Othman’s “Wordsworth Lied” is a sequel to the preceding analysis of Niyi 
Osundare’s “Poetry is”, but it takes a different form and approach. Whereas Osundare, as 
discussed above, sets out to liberate poetry from the modernist tradition of poetic composition 
(allusions to Greek and Roman myths), Othman offers a critique of the Romantic conception of 
what poetry is and how it should be read. In fact, it might be argued that the title of the poem 
brings Othman close to the tone of cynicism inherent in Odia Ofeimun’s “The Poet Lied”. Egya 
(2014) maintains, by contrast, that the belligerent aspect of Othman towards Wordsworth’s 
conception of poetry implicitly suggests his revolutionary stance against the mythopoeia of first 
generation Nigerian writer (p. 59).  
Central to the speaker’s tone of cynicism against “Wordsworth” (one of the leading theorists 
and writers of the Romanticism movement) is that experience cannot be achieved and sustained 
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by mere emotion. In the context of the poem, Wordsworth is not the flesh and blood writer of 
the Romanticism period (a historical self), but rather a symbolic representation or an eponym of 
the Romantic-Humanist tradition (a textual entity) for whom “All good poetry is the 
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” that are “recollected/ In tranquility”: 
Wordsworth lied 
That poetry is emotion 
recollected 
In tranquility. 
The Romantics positioned imagination and intuition at the center of their philosophical thinking 
and writing. That is, human being can only make sense of existence and contemporary world 
through an intimately connection with metaphysical natures as made know in their natural or 
immediate environment. For the Romantics, poetry or literature is imaginative form of writing 
that expresses and represents the creativeness of the author as made manifest through divine 
knowledge and inspiration. On this theory, literature is regarded as imaginative not to reduce it 
to the status of fictional entity, rather to attribute it to the creative and personal experience of the 
author; it is more of factual experience than an illusionary thought. In other words, poetry is 
regarded as a medium of personal experience, feelings, minds on social reality and theological 
truth. The Romantics attribute literary work as an imaginative work of art; literature is 
imaginative not merely because it is fictional or untrue, but it suggests some form of creativity 
and visionary (Eagleton 2008, p. 16). 
One of the leading figures of this revolutionary leap of thought is William Wordsworth. In his 
preface to the second edition of Lyrical Ballads, he offers a new and critical direction for the 
composition and understanding of poetry (literature) and literary theory. There is a shift in focus 
and content from enlightened aristocratic men and women, king and queen to the downtrodden 
men and women in natural or rural setting. Thus, Wordsworth calls for an ordinary and 
everyday language that best expresses the thought and idea of peasants, rather than the complex 
and condensed poetic form of the eighteenth-century writing. On this note, Wordsworth 
maintains that “For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.” The role 
of the poet in contemporary world, Wordsworth argues, is not to celebrate the scientific culture 
but to demonstrate “a greater readiness and power in expressing what he thinks and feels, and 
especially those thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the structure of his 
own mind, arise in him without immediate external excitement.”  
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To work in accordance to extraneous values or principles hinder the free flow of the poet’s 
“powerful feeling” towards the content of his writing: in writing and thinking what is necessary 
is the poet’s imagination and emotional feeling (intuition), not reason; reason poses a great treat 
on the emotional recollection of feelings when expressed with words on the page. The process 
of interpretive model, Wordsworth notes, should seek the authorial sensibility and emotional 
feeling inscribed in the text without making reference to any critical judgment outside the 
psychological disposition of the text: “I have one request to make of my reader, which is, that in 
judging these poems, he would decide by his own feelings genuinely, and not by reflection upon 
what will probably be the judgment of others.” To evaluate and grasp the overall meaning of a 
text is for the reader to establish a connection between the text and poet’s personal experience as 
“recollected in tranquility”. 
On the contrary, the speaker pitches the whole concept of “emotion” into crisis. It is not the 
medium of expression, the speaker argues, that “matter[s]” in evaluating the emotion of the 
poem but rather the ultimate meaning derived from “words” on the page. Contrarily to 
Wordsworth’s notion of “tranquility”, the speaker likens the outpouring of emotion to “When 
words drop from my pen/ Like arrow from the quiver”. Therefore, for the speaker, the ultimate 
identity of a poem lies not in the emotional effect recollected in the “words”. Rather it seeks to 
locate and understand the condition under which the intentional structure of literary form of a 
poem can chart the ways of making meaning of “emotion”. The speaker maintains that the 
identity of the writer is not fixed and recoverable in the text; only the intentionality incorporated 
in the words on the page is fixed and remained. By implication, the very moment the “I” writes, 
it enters into its “death”. To “die” metaphorically means that no appreciation or criticism can 
ever return again to the hand that “wrote a poem”. Put another way, the textual narrator (the 
writing “I”), to be distinguished from the flesh and blood author, is always and prior a dead 
man’s name, a name of death. What returns to the textual “I” never returns to the historical “I”. 
No authorial or reader subjective apprehension of the text can “reduce” the very identity of the 
text since “words” presume unity of meaning. The poem serves as a credo for deconstruction’s 
tenets of presence and language; a poem being a performative act, illimitable in different 
contexts, is structurally readable beyond the death of the “I” that “wrote a poem”. The speaker 
desires to “edit” (furnish it with unified meaning), but it is impossible to do so. 
There is this desire on the part of the speaker to resolve the contradictions, tensions, paradoxes, 
ambiguities inherent in the endless chain of signifiers, which, paradoxically, differs reading and 
writing to irreducible interpretation. In this light, Spivak (1976) discursively points out, in 
"Translator's Preface,", Of Grammatology: “The desire for unity and order compels the author 
and the reader to balance the equation that is the text's system. The deconstructive reader... 
[seeks] the moment in the text which harbors the unbalancing of the equation, the sleight of 
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hand at the limit of a text which cannot be dismissed simply as a contradiction” (p. xlix). The 
speaker is, to be sure, conscious of the figurative nature of language and the workings of the 
differential trace. 
In the final stanza, the speaker defines “Poetry” as a spontaneous overflowing of emotion “like” 
a sudden “death” of an infant. This definition undermines and stands in sharp contrast to the 
slow and careful scrutiny of the sensibility and intent outside the organic unity of “words” on 
the page (“pain”). However, it could be argued that the speaker’s view is unsuccessful in its 
attempt to privilege textual meaning over authorial meaning. The speaker’s radical approach 
against the romantic assumption of poetry (or literature) as an autonomous entity of the mind is 
centered on the nature of the whole complex interrelationship between form and content. For the 
speaker, the “recollection” and “tranquility” of “pain” can never lead to the real meaning of the 
mental calisthenics, since the paradox between “pain” and “emotion” cannot be resolved by 
mere “recollection” and “tranquility”.  
The speaker’s argument of the ontological existence of meaning (“pain”) prior to the poem goes 
some ways toward explaining the autonomy and unity of the poetic consciousness (“words”). 
The speaker argues for an intrinsic reading of poetry without inference and reference to the 
intentional meaning of the authorial intent. Poetry, he stresses, is not merely an imitation of 
“emotion recollected/ In tranquility” but ordering and unifying of emotion through a 
corresponding order of verbal structure (“words”) which in turn serves as a final inward 
direction to meaning. What difference does it make if emotion is “recollected/In tranquility” or 
“Like arrows from the quiver”?  The speaker is short-sighted to realize that the poem could be 
read without the recollection of “pain” inscribed in the “words”; the play and critique of the 
warring forces of signification (language) in the poem automatically dismantle inheritance and 
given structure and form. (see Derrida 2019, p.23).  
T.S. Elliot, in his influential essay entitled “Tradition and Individual Talent”, argues that 
“sensitive and honest criticism should be directed towards poetry and not the poet” (p. 76). That 
is in evaluating a literary text, the focus should be on language as the active determinant of 
meaning rather than passive since, as the Anglo-American New critics Wimsatt and Beardsley 
(1972) put it, “the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a 
standard for judging the success of literary work” (p. 334). To seek for what the author means in 
his text, Wimsatt and Beardsley write, “would have nothing to do” with the phenomenological 
assessment of the text. This is not to say that the author of flesh and blood, whose name is 
inscribed on the cover page of the text, is restricted from engaging in the reading of his text, 
whatever might be the outcome of his reading is nothing but another text which stands in sharp 
opposition to what the text says and what other critics have said about the text; the meaning 
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derive from the author of a given text does not furnished it with “transcendental truth” but rather 
opens up infinitely a space of irresolvable contradictions between what the author meant to say 
and the alternative readings derived from the text. To put the point more technically in the 
words of Bennett and Royle (2004): “Just because it comes ‘from the horse’s mouth’ does not 
mean that the horse is telling the truth, or that the horse knows the truth, or indeed that what the 
horse has to say about the ‘words on the page’ is any more interesting or illuminating than what 
anyone else might have to say” (p. 21). 
 The speaker’s affirmations that: “It is the pain they [words] paint/ That creates the emotion for 
poetry” rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of words or signs. There is no word that can 
offer a final meaning or stop the movement of signification. For Derrida, language is completely 
unreliable, unstable, and uncertain. Words are not referential or representational but rather 
rhetorical. Paul de Man (1971) also argues that the sign will continue to act as a chain of 
signifiers without a definite signified. The sign is devoid of a definite meaning, not because it 
has to be a transparent indicator of plurality of meaning, but because the meaning itself is 
illimitable (p. 127). For Derrida, using the Saussurean’s linguistic system or principles based on 
difference, any given sign is a moving chain of differential traces since it always serves as a 
signifier for more signifiers. A deconstructive reading, in practice, does not seek to rehearse 
how the arguments for and against the thesis on “tranquility” or “pain” can heighten the overall 
meaning of a poem, but rather explores how the forward and sideways movement of language 
produces and infinitely twists, postponed meaning. The speaker’s formula defining poetry as “a 
recurrent emotion/That shatters tranquility/ Like the bewildering death/Of an innocent child” is 
only necessary if it allows discourse to remain at the textual surface without delving deeper for 
final “pain they paint” and “create” for poetry. The partial failure of the speaker is due to its 
insensitivity to the performative acts of “words” that can never come to a rest but continuing 
signifying de infinitude. 
However, there are significant points which need to be explored. The speaker invites its readers 
to imaginatively recreate the “pain” or experience of other human beings. In this sense, poetry is 
a moral phenomenon that deepens and sharpens the reader’s emotion of human “pain” without 
actually having to “recollect it in tranquility.” It is “pain” by the virtue of its form that matter, 
rather than the “emotion” inscribed in the poem. George Eliot makes similar assertion when he 
argues that: “The only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings is that those who read 
them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains and joys of those who differ from 
themselves in everything but the broad fact of being struggling erring human creatures” (cited in 
Terry Eagleton 2013, p. 56). Both the speaker and Eliot are of the view that it is the effect 
poetry “paints” on the mind of the reader that should be the focus of reading and interpretation, 
one which gives access to the inner lives of others, rather than being held spellbound in the 
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“recollection of tranquility.” This argument is a beautiful and tremendous critical effort, but 
limited. The speaker is unable to acknowledge that not all literary works invite readers to term 
with moral phenomenon. Thus, “pain” is not at all the only medium of understanding “the 
emotion” in poetry. In this sense, the speaker’s argument is an attempt to make the reader to 
empathize with others. On the contrary, empathy hinders and blunts the sheer pleasure of 
reading in readers’ attempts to understand and pass judgmental on the “pains” of others. 
Although, poetry may attempt to invite the reader to empathize with its subject matter; it is the 
task of critics to scrupulously critique the formal and thematic paradoxes, tensions, 
contradictions in the poem, and not to dance to the intent and intentionality of the poem. 
4      Conclusion 
The above analysis is an attempt to problematize the whole concept of identity in poetry and, by 
implication, in literary works. The aporetic aspects of the Niyi Osundare’s “Poetry Is” and 
Abubakar Othman’s “Wordsworth Lied” lie in their attempts to foist identity of what poetry is 
or could be. Their persuasive arguments of what “poetry is” and the whole empathetic effect of 
poetry are bent out of true by the workings of language. Put another way, the language of the 
poems garbles identity and turns contradictions on their head. This paper is not an abdication of 
pitfalls or illusion inherent in critical thoughts or refusal of intellectual efforts; rather, it is a 
demonstration of the impossibility of definite identity. On the whole, the paper concludes that 
every attempt by the speakers in the poems is a self-destructive one in which the murder 
becomes suicide. Whereas the poems invite readers to term with the genre of poetry and the 
sensitive appreciation to be devoted to it, this paper in turn illustrates the impossibility of 
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